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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3582 
 ___________ 
 
 GEORGE E. RAY, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF OMAHA; J.P. MORGAN CHASE  
NATIONAL BANK; AND WELLS FARGO 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania  
 (D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-02845) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Stewart Dalzell 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to 
 Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 13, 2011 
 Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed February 11, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 George Ray, proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his 
complaint.  Because the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will 
summarily affirm. 
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I. 
 Ray, who was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, filed a complaint 
against First National Bank of Omaha, J.P. Morgan Chase National Bank, and Wells 
Fargo in 2009.  He alleged that the Defendants violated the Patriot Act
1
 and committed 
fraud on him and the Internal Revenue Service by classifying his accounts as “bad debts” 
and selling them to collection agencies.  He sought $ 9 million in damages.
2
 
 The Defendants filed motions to dismiss to the complaint.  Because Ray mailed 
his response to the motions directly to chambers, the District Judge issued an order 
directing the Clerk to docket the response.  Ray appealed from that order.  Consequently, 
the District Court issued an order denying the Defendants’ motions without prejudice and 
directing the case to be transferred to the court’s civil suspense docket pending the 
outcome of Ray’s appeal.  After this Court dismissed Ray’s appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction, the District Court ordered that the case be transferred back to the active 
docket and dismissed it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for “fail[ure] to state a 
claim on which relief may be granted.” 
                                                 
1
 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272 (2001). 
 
2
 Ray previously filed a similar complaint against First National Bank of Omaha and 
Global Acceptance Credit Company, L.P., in which he alleged that he became unable to 
pay a debt to the bank because of a disabling injury, and the bank took a tax deduction for 
the amount of the “bad debt,” thereby being “made whole,” and then sold the debt to the 
collection agency.  He contended that this sale of the account constituted fraud.  See 
Complaint, Ray v. Bank of Omaha, et al., No. 08-cv-03222 (E.D. Pa. Jul. 16, 2008).  The 
District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, concluding that Ray 
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II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review of the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of the complaint for failure to 
state a claim, and we must accept as true the allegations of fact in Ray’s complaint and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.  Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 
2000).  If no substantial question is presented by this appeal, we may summarily affirm 
the District Court’s order on any ground supported by the record.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 
27.4; IOP 10.6; Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 The District Court discerned two claims in Ray’s complaint:  that (1) he and the 
Internal Revenue Service were defrauded by the Defendants’ sale of his accounts to 
collection agencies after being “reimbursed by the I.R.S,” see Complaint at 2, Ray v. 
First National Bank of Omaha, et al., No. 09-cv-02845 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2009), 
and (2) the Defendants violated the Patriot Act by selling his personal data (birthdate, 
social security number, etc.) as part of the sale of the accounts.  Even reading the 
complaint liberally, the District Court could not find either claim legally cognizable 
because Ray “provided almost no specific facts regarding the events that led him to file 
his Complaint.”  See Order, Ray v. First National Bank of Omaha, et al., No. 09-cv-
02845 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2010). 
 We likewise fail to see anything more than blanket assertions of entitlement for 
relief, which are insufficient to sustain the complaint.  A complaint must provide “enough 
                                                                                                                                                             
was not a party to the allegedly fraudulent sale and therefore was entitled to no remedy.  
See Order, Ray v. Bank of Omaha, et al., No. 08-cv-03222 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2008). 
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facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  See Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  While “detailed factual allegations” are not 
necessary, a plaintiff ’s obligation to provide the grounds upon which his claim rests 
“requires more than labels and conclusions.”  Id. at 555. 
 The deficiencies in Ray’s complaint are many.  For example, he asserts that the 
Defendants committed fraud on the Internal Revenue Service by taking a tax deduction 
for the bad debt, but does not connect this allegation to any elements of a cause of action.  
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief 
above the speculative level”).  Furthermore, he alleges no particularized injury to himself 
from the alleged fraud upon the Internal Revenue Service, nor does he otherwise identify 
how he may bring an action on behalf of the agency.  See e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (one of the elements of constitutional standing to 
bring suit is a concrete injury personal to the plaintiff). 
 Ray’s allegations also fail to suggest how the Defendants’ sale of his debt 
accounts to collection agencies constitutes a fraud against him when he was not a party to 
the transaction.  Without being able to ascertain from the complaint what theory of fraud 
Ray envisions, we simply note that he does not allege that the Defendants made any 
misrepresentation to him, that he relied on it to his detriment, or that he personally was 
injured by their conduct.  See, e.g., EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 
275-76 (3d Cir. 2010) (setting forth elements of fraudulent inducement under 
Pennsylvania law).  As for his assertion that the sale violated the Patriot Act, Ray does 
not identify what section of the act was violated or explain how he may bring a private 
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action to enforce it.  Furthermore, courts that have considered the question have 
concluded that the Patriot Act does not provide for a private right of action for its 
enforcement.  See, e.g., Hanninen v. Fedoravitch, 583 F. Supp. 2d 322, 326 (D. Conn. 
2008); Med. Supply Chain, Inc. v. Neoforma, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1330 (D. Kan. 
2006).  Accordingly, we agree that Ray’s complaint does not state a claim on which relief 
may be granted.
3
    
 A district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without allowing the 
plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint unless an amendment would be 
inequitable or futile.  See Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).  As it 
appears that amendment would be futile, for the reasons expressed in the previous 
paragraph, we conclude that the District Court did not err by declining to afford Ray 
leave to amend. 
 There being no substantial question presented by Ray’s appeal, we will summarily 
affirm the District Court’s order.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; IOP 10.6.  We deny Ray’s 
motion to compel an answer. 
                                                 
3
 In his written submission on appeal, Ray does not address the District Court’s order 
other than to say the court “disregarded” the facts he presented.  He perhaps 
misunderstands the court’s decision:  the few facts in the complaint were considered and 
found insufficient.  Ray also argues that he was entitled to a default judgment before the 
dismissal because the Defendants did not answer his complaint.  He was not.  First, Ray 
did not request that a default be entered.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).  Second, the manner 
in which the case proceeded did not require the Defendants to file an answer before the 
complaint was dismissed.  
